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 The Ghost in the Attic? The Italian 
National Innovation System in 
Historical Perspective, 1861–2011 
 ALESSANDRO  NUVOLARI 
 MICHELANGELO  VASTA 
 “I must rattle my chains, and groan through keyholes, and walk 
about at night, if that is what you mean. It is my only reason for 
existing.”  “It is no reason at all for existing and you have been 
very wicked.” 
 Oscar Wilde,  The Canterville Ghost, 1887 
 Since its political uniﬁ cation (1861), Italy has been a country char-
acterized by limited investments in scientiﬁ c research and inno-
vative activities. At the same time, however, its performance in 
terms of economic growth has been nothing short of remarkable 
(especially keeping in mind that Italy is a country with a limited 
endowment of energy and other natural resources) and it is com-
parable with those of other major Western economies. Therefore, 
 prima facie , the Italian case can provide us with some interesting 
insights concerning the relationship between scientiﬁ c and tech-
nological activities and growth performance. Is the Italian case 
a historical example showing that technical change is not really 
the key driver of economic growth? Or perhaps, does the Italian 
case show that it is possible to attain substantial rates of technical 
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progress without signiﬁ cant efforts in research and development 
(R&D) activities? Or is Italy perhaps just a “lucky exception” to the 
general rule, being the example of a country that, by design or acci-
dent, discovered some  substitute that could replace the role played 
by science and technology as drivers of economic growth in other 
countries? In this article we tackle these questions by providing 
a comprehensive reappraisal of the complex interactions between 
scientiﬁ c and technological activities and economic growth in Italy 
since the uniﬁ cation. 
 The study of the relationship between technical change and com-
parative economic development represents perhaps one of the most 
important themes of research in economic history. Although (main-
stream) economists have, for a long time, conceived of technology as 
a “public good” that is freely accessible by all countries, economic 
historians have instead recognized that the successful assimilation 
of innovations is by no means automatic and that it requires signif-
icant efforts and investments in the concomitant development of 
new skills and competencies. Furthermore, the introduction of new 
technologies requires a creative process of adaptation to the speciﬁ c 
local circumstances prevailing in the importing country.  1  In this 
perspective, the existence of technology gaps can be seen as the 
prime source accounting for differences in economic performance 
across countries. 
 The increasing recognition that country-speciﬁ c factors shape the 
process of technological change at the national level was the main 
source of inspiration of the notion of the National Innovation System 
(NIS) in the late 1980s.  2  The concept of the NIS is based on the idea 
that innovation is the outcome of “social” processes in which a vari-
ety of actors (such as individuals, ﬁ rms, public institutions, and the 
like) are involved. According to the NIS view, the key actors and the 
key interactions featuring in innovation processes have a predomi-
nantly  national character. 
 This perspective, to some extent, overlaps with the “varieties 
of capitalism” approach. For example, Hall and Soskice argue that 
institutional differences between liberal market economies and 
coordinated market economies should lead to the emergence of dif-
ferent innovation patterns across countries, suggesting implicitly 
the possibility of constructing a typology of different NISs.  3  In this 
 1.  Mokyr,  The Lever of Riches ; Fagerberg, “Technology and International Dif-
ferences.” 
 2.  Freeman,  Technology Policy and Economic Performance ; Lundvall, 
 National Systems of Innovation ; Nelson,  National Innovation Systems . For 
a recent comprehensive overview, see Soete, Verspagen and ter Weel, “Systems 
of Innovation.” 
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article, rather than looking at the Italian experience as an attempt to 
emulate the innovation systems of the leader countries, we consider it 
as an attempt to develop an appropriate ensemble of “substitutes” for 
supporting innovation in a technologically lagging country. The key 
interpretative issue then becomes the assessment of the peculiar Ital-
ian variety of NIS. As we shall see, in a comparative perspective, Italy 
is a country characterized by a structurally weak NIS. Our contention 
is that this weakness has forced the country to adopt a peculiar path 
toward “modern economic growth” characterized by a combination 
of low real wages and intensive use of unskilled labor. The rest of 
the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize 
the main interpretations concerning the relationships among science, 
technology, and Italian economic growth. The third section recon-
structs the historical evolution of the Italian NIS in comparative per-
spective, using both quantitative and qualitative evidence. The fourth 
section discusses the relationship between innovation systems and 
entrepreneurship. The ﬁ fth section deals with the role of real wages 
as a powerful contextual factor shaping the Italian pattern of innova-
tive activities. The last section presents the conclusions. 
 Science, Technology, and Italian Economic Growth: 
Interpretations 
 Broadly speaking, in the literature it is possible to identify two main 
views about the role played by technological change in Italian eco-
nomic growth. The ﬁ rst view, which may be labeled as the  optimist 
perspective, considers the Italian pattern of technical change as a 
rational response to a resource endowment characterized by a scarce 
availability of natural resources and by a structural abundance of 
unskilled labor. In this context, it was pointless to invest a large 
amount of resources in the development of cutting-edge technolo-
gies. Rather, a more suitable strategy consisted in adapting technol-
ogies developed abroad to the speciﬁ cities of the Italian context. 
 The second view, which can be called as the  pessimist perspective, 
considers the Italian case as a prolonged failure to develop an autono-
mous innovative capacity. In this view, technical change is conceived 
as a tool for overcoming resource constraints and, accordingly, the 
weak Italian performance in innovative activities represent a missed 
 3.  Hall and Soskice,  Varieties of Capitalism , 37–44. For a critical discussion 
of Hall and Soskice’s approach, see Akkermans, Castaldi, and Los, “Do ‘Liberal 
Market Economies’.” 
273The Ghost in the Attic?
opportunity to set the country on a more secure footing in its path 
toward “modern economic growth.” 
 The optimist approach is well summarized in a survey book by 
Cohen and Federico,  4  who adopt a neoclassical perspective in which 
technology is akin to a public good that can be easily acquired off the 
shelf without requiring the development of absorptive capabilities. 
Accordingly, for Italian ﬁ rms the best option was to invest their limited 
resources in adapting imported technologies: “technology mixing 
and matching was a rational response to relative factor prices.”  5  
The relevance of the connection between factor prices and choice of 
techniques has been also elaborated in other contributions: Federico 
emphasizes the relative success of Italian light industries in becom-
ing internationally competitive by relying on essentially (unskilled) 
labor intensive production processes and not particularly sophisti-
cated technologies;  6  Bardini, instead, argues that, in the case of Italy, 
the lack of coal represented a powerful obstacle preventing a satis-
factory adoption of steam power technologies. Italy has instead been 
more successful in the introduction of the technologies based on elec-
tricity, which are more suited to its resource endowment.  7  
 The success of Italian small ﬁ rms in light industries and traditional 
sectors is also a theme that has featured prominently in the literature on 
Italian “industrial districts.”  8  In the industrial districts, small ﬁ rms are 
involved in continuous, cooperative, non-formalized learning processes, 
often leading to streams of successful incremental innovations. These 
activities are often underestimated by traditional innovation indica-
tors. In this perspective, Italy has followed an alternative model of 
development not characterized by the central role of formalized R&D 
activities and the growth of high-tech industries.  9  
 The pessimist account has been delineated in two versions. The 
contribution of Giannetti may be deﬁ ned as a “moderate pessimist” 
picture; he maintains that Italy has been able to develop effective 
capabilities for the assimilation of innovations from abroad, but not 
for the autonomous creation of new technologies.  10  He is keen on 
 4.  Cohen and Federico,  The Development of Italian Economy . 
 5.  Ibid., p. 52. 
 6.  Federico, “Italy, 1860–1940.” 
 7.  Bardini,  Senza carbone nell’età del vapore . 
 8.  Becattini,  Mercato e forze locali ; Brusco and Paba, “Per una storia dei dis-
tretti industriali.” 
 9.  A further recent development of the optimist approach is the study of the 
evolution of the Italian economy in the period 1950–1992, by Antonelli and 
Barbiellini Amidei,  The Dynamics of Knowledge Externalities . 
 10.  Another recent contribution highlighting the capability of the Italian NIS 
in absorbing technologies developed abroad is Barbiellini Amidei, Cantwell, and 
Spadavecchia, “Innovation and Foreign Technology.” 
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emphasizing the repeated Italian failure of entering high-tech sectors. 
However, he also emphasizes that the creation of absorptive capabil-
ities allowed Italy to participate in some of the major technological 
trajectories of the ﬁ rst (although with considerable delay) and the sec-
ond industrial revolutions.  11  The contribution of Malerba shares the 
same moderate pessimist view; he adopts the conceptual framework 
of NIS and considers the post-World War II period. Malerba argues 
that the Italian innovation system actually comprised two distinct 
innovation systems: (1) “small ﬁ rm networks” operating either in 
traditional, low-tech industries or in equipment supplier industries, 
very often clustered in speciﬁ c locations; and (2) a core R&D system 
comprising large ﬁ rms, public research laboratories, and universities. 
The core R&D system is extremely fragile, with limited capabilities 
in the generation of new technologies. The performance of the small 
ﬁ rm network is satisfactory, but this produces only adaptations and 
incremental innovations.  12  The contribution of Vasta has, instead, a 
pessimist view throughout: He adopts a broader conceptualization of 
the NIS that looks both at scientiﬁ c and technology policies and at the 
formation of human capital, which is a crucial element of an effec-
tive  absorptive capacity . Accordingly, the weaknesses of the Italian 
NIS have, in the long run, produced a number of structural deﬁ cien-
cies that had many detrimental cumulative effects that are not easily 
reversible.  13  
 The Italian NIS: A Historical Profile 
 The aim of this section is to provide a description of the historical 
evolution of the Italian NIS. We adopt the traditional distinction 
between input and output indicators of innovation. The ﬁ rst input 
indicator we consider is the human capital endowment of a country 
that directly affects its ability to use, adapt and develop new technol-
ogies.  14  A useful proxy of the aggregate human capital endowment 
of a country, charted in  Figure 1 , is the average years of schooling 
of the population (aged between 15 and 64). The indicator shows 
a signiﬁ cant gap between Italy and the other major countries. Fur-
thermore, Italy remains the country in the lowest position—except 
for Spain in the past forty years—going from 0.9 years in 1870 to 11 
years in 2010. 
 11.  Giannetti,  Tecnologia e sviluppo economico italiano . 
 12.  Malerba, “The National System of Innovation.” 
 13.  Vasta, “Capitale umano.” 
 14.  Abramovitz, “Catching Up, Forging Ahead.” 
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 Turning our attention to more traditional input indicators, Table 1 shows 
the evolution of R&D expenditure on GDP for selected countries. 
The table shows that Italy is characterized by a very signiﬁ cant gap 
persisting throughout the entire period. Italy is far not only from the 
most advanced countries that traditionally invest signiﬁ cant amounts of 
resources in research (Germany, Japan and United States), but also from 
South Korea and China, which have overtaken Italy in the past decade. 
 The ﬁ rst output indicator we consider is the number of patents. 
 Table 2 shows the number of patents issued in the United States to 
residents in the major industrialized countries per million inhabitants.  15  
 Figure 2 complements  Table 2 by charting the historical evolution of 
the share of Italian patents in the United States over time. 
 Table 2 shows that the Italian long-term innovative performance 
measured using U.S. patents was, in general, very weak and far from 
that of countries with similar levels of income. However, by looking 
at  Figure 2 , four distinct phases can be highlighted: the ﬁ rst, of rapid 
growth ending at the beginning of the 1920s, when Italy reached a 
peak (2.5 percent). This period was characterized by the effects of 
World War I, when several industries with high technological inten-
sity developed, such as steel production and chemicals.  16  This phase 
is followed by a period of relative decline that coincided with the rise 
  
 Figure 1  Average years of schooling of population (15–64 years) in selected 
countries 
 Source: Our own elaborations on Morrisson and Murtin, “The Century of 
Education.” 
 15.  To overcome the problems originating from differences in countries’ patent 
legislation, international comparisons typically consider patenting activity by sub-
jects of different nationalities in a third country—in this case, the United States. 
 16.  Zamagni, “L’industria chimica in Italia”; Amatori, “Italy: The Tormented 
Rise.” 
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 Figure 2  Patents granted to Italian residents in the United states as a percent-
age of total patents granted to foreign residents (1883–2010) 
 Source: our own elaboration: for 1883–1962, on U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Patent and Trademark Office,  Technology Assessment ; for 1963–2010, 
on USPTO.GOV  Extended Year Set , data extracted on April 1, 2012. 
 17.  Petri,  Storia economica d’Italia . 
 18.  It is interesting to note that 1963 is also considered as turning point by Russo 
and Santoni,  Ingegni minuti , 442; Gomellini and Pianta, “Commercio con l’estero 
e tecnologia in Italia negli anni Cinquanta e Sessanta,” 561; and Pivato,  Il miracolo 
scippato . 
of fascism, the autarchic period, and World War II, during which 
the share of Italian patents decreased signiﬁ cantly. Indeed, the levels 
registered in the early 1920s were exceeded only in the early 1950s. 
This seems to contradict the interpretation of Petri, who considers 
this historical phase as a moment of consolidation of Italian techno-
logical capabilities.  17  The third phase coincides with the period of 
the Italian Golden Age (1950–1970), when the share culminated in 
the historical peak of 4.4 percent in 1963. The “effervescence” of this 
historical phase is also conﬁ rmed by the a number of success stories 
of breakthrough innovations, such as the polypropylene invented by 
Giulio Natta during the 1950s and the  Perottina invented in 1964 by 
Giorgio Perotti.  18  Subsequently, a new phase of decline ensued with 
a constant reduction in performance, with an average value of 3.4 
percent during the 1970s and of 3.1 percent during the 1980s. A drastic 
deterioration of the performance occurred from the mid-1990s, so 
that in 2000 the share was equal to the levels of the 1920s, with a fur-
ther drop to 1.7 in 2010, the level reached at the eve of World War I. 
 Further insights on Italian innovative performance emerge from 
a closer look at the historical development of the patent system in Italy. 
Conventional economic theory suggests that, without patent protection, 
incentives for innovation will be lacking. Hence, an effective system of 
patent protection is a necessary prerequisite for the attainment of sub-
stantial levels of innovative investment. The historical evidence instead 
suggests a much more nuanced picture, especially for countries that are 
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catching up with the world’s technological frontier.  19  Indeed, many 
successful catching-up countries adopted judicious policies concerning 
intellectual property rights to make sure that patents could act not only 
as an incentive, but also as a tool for transferring technologies from 
abroad. Thus, many nineteenth-century patent systems contemplated 
the possibility of granting patents not only for new inventions, but 
also for importing technologies from abroad. More importantly, many 
nineteenth-century patent systems contained discriminatory measures 
against foreign inventors—sometimes explicitly, sometimes in the actual 
practice of the legal procedures. For example, in the United States, pat-
ents were initially restricted to American citizens (a ban that was grad-
ually relaxed) and until 1861, foreign applicants were required to pay 
higher fees.  20  An illustration of discriminatory practices against foreign 
inventors is provided also by the obstacles raised by the German patent 
ofﬁ ce against U.S. machine tool makers during the 1920s.  21  Italy did not 
follow these examples of discrimination against foreign patentees, but it 
developed a patent system that could also be used effectively by foreign 
inventors.  22  The lack of discrimination in the Italian system is particu-
larly visible when we consider the relative openness of the patent sys-
tem.  23  This may be measured by considering the share of patents granted 
to foreign applicants of the total number of patents granted ( Table 3 ). 
 Table 3  Share of foreign patents in total patents granted 
 c. 1880 c. 1901 c. 1914 1927 c. 1938 c. 1963 1979 c. 1991 c. 2010 
Belgium 69.3 78.4 89.5 89.1 53.6 20.3 
France 51.4 50.8 42.8 55.0 65.3 72.2 31.2 11.3 
Germany 31.1 37.1 30.1 24.4 19.2 37.2 51.7 38.1 29.6 
 Italy  64.4  61.5  62.8  57.7  72.2  77.2  25.5  10.7 
Japan 27.7 17.4 35.9 21.0 15.6 15.9 
Netherlands 80.2 80.0 76.9 81.1 86.8 88.8 15.7 
Switzerland 39.1 67.3 62.0 59.3 55.9 66.3 75.2 45.6 37.8 
United Kingdom 53.2 - 53.3 55.6 74.7 79.9 64.6 58.5 
United States 13.3 11.5 11.8 15.2 18.6 37.4 47.0 50.9 
 Source: Our own elaborations on  http://www.wipo.org , extracted July 1, 2012. 
 19.  Odagiri, Goto, Sunami, and Nelson, “Introduction.” 
 20.  Mowery, “IPRs and US Economic Catch-Up,” 36. 
 21.  Richter and Streb, “Catching-Up and Falling Behind.” 
 22.  Lerner, in his comparative study of the structure of worldwide patent systems, 
claims that in Italy at the uniﬁ cation there was a discriminatory fee (+50%) for foreign 
applicants, which was later removed; see Lerner, “150 Years of Patent Protection,” 
Table 5. However, this does not appear conﬁ rmed by the text of the law (Legge 28 
Febbraio 1826, n. 1899, Regno di Sardegna, and Legge 31 Gennaio 1864, n. 1657, 
Regno d’Italia). 
 23.  The other distinguishing feature of the Italian patent system from 1859 to 
1939 was that it did not contemplate an examination procedure. The system was 
simply a registration system. For a compact overview of the Italian patent system, 
see Vasta,  Innovazione tecnologica , 121–126. 
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 Until 1979, the Italian system was extremely open, with a share 
of patents granted to foreign inventors that exceeded 50 percent, 
which is very similar to that of small open economies such as those 
of the Netherlands and Belgium.  24  The general impression is that 
the “openness” of the Italian system may have induced the transfer 
of technologies from abroad but, on the other hand, it might have 
been also less suited in stimulating the use of foreign technologies 
as a base for autonomous innovations. 
 Turning our attention now to the generation of scientiﬁ c knowledge, 
we consider the number of scientiﬁ c publications as an output indicator. 
For this purpose, we use two different samples: the overall world 
scientiﬁ c production extracted from the Scopus database (henceforth 
All-Scopus [AS]) and a subsample of this database, which should 
approximate the excellence of research activity, represented by the 
two leading “generalist” scientiﬁ c journals in the world: the English 
 Nature and the American  Science (henceforth N&S).  Figure 3 com-
pares the shares of Italian publications in AS and in N&S with the 
shares of Italian patenting activity in the United States. To check the 
  
 Figure 3  Technological activity versus research activity, Italy (1883–2011). 
 Note: The series have been smoothed with a five-period moving average; all 
documents in AS concerning areas of life sciences, health sciences, and physical 
sciences. The countries considered are China, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, 
Netherland, Spain, South Korea, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United 
States. 
 Source: Our own elaboration: for publications, Scopus database ( http://www.
scopus.com/home.url ); data extracted on April 7 and June 26, 2012; de Solla 
Price,  Little Science ; May, “The Scientific Wealth of Nations”; King, “The 
Scientific Impact of Nations.” For patents, see  Table 2 . 
 24.  The decline in the share after 1979 is probably due to the creation of the 
European Patent Ofﬁ ce (EPO). 
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reliability of our estimates based on the Scopus database, in the ﬁ gure 
we also include some alternative estimates of the Italian share pro-
vided by other scholars: the pioneering contribution by de Solla Price 
and the more recent studies by May and King.  25  Overall,  Figure 3 
points to some important characteristics of the Italian innovation sys-
tem. First, looking at the whole period, scientiﬁ c activities dominate 
patent activities. Second, scientiﬁ c activity increases considerably in 
the early 1960s when, to the contrary, the share of patents declines. 
Third, the “mismatch” between science and technology becomes 
even more apparent after the 1980s, when the share of Italian publica-
tions in N&S grows rapidly, whereas the share of patents drops. This 
latter trend is probably due to the growing internationalization of the 
Italian academic system, at least in hard sciences. 
 The diverging performance between scientiﬁ c and technological 
activities suggest the existence of major difﬁ culties in the technology 
transfer of scientiﬁ c results from universities to ﬁ rms (lack of bridging 
institutions) and, more generally, the existence of research systems 
that seem able to deliver a reasonable performance, although not an 
outstanding one, and that are more sophisticated that the system of 
industrial research in business ﬁ rms. 
 Figure 3 shows also different phases in Italian performance in sci-
entiﬁ c research. In the ﬁ rst phase, running from the uniﬁ cation up to 
the end of the 1880s, the Italian share of scientiﬁ c papers is around 
0.6 percent, whereas starting from the beginning of the 1890s, in the 
Giolittian era, this value grew considerably, overcoming the threshold 
of 2.5 percent.  26  World War I produced a drastic decline and, during 
the interwar period, even if characterized by a positive trend, the 
Italian share of world scientiﬁ c production remained under 1 percent. 
Italian performance increased considerably during the Golden Age, 
passing from 1.8 percent in 1950 to 4 percent in 1973. After this 
period, the Italian share remained substantially stable, at around 4 
percent. 
 This quantitative picture is consistent with accounts produced by 
historians of science in Italy. From the uniﬁ cation up to World War I, 
there was no real integration of the system of scientiﬁ c research and 
industrial applications, so the growth of scientiﬁ c research was due, 
by and large, to the expansion of the university system and to the 
 25.  de Solla Price,  Little Science ; May, “The Scientiﬁ c Wealth of Nations”; King, 
“The Scientiﬁ c Impact of Nations.” 
 26.  In the study by Forman, Heilbron, and Weart, which contains a compre-
hensive survey on the state of academic physics in the world around 1900, Italy 
appears to lag behind Germany, France, and the UK both in terms of funding and 
in terms of scientiﬁ c production. See Forman, Heilbron, and Weart, “Physics circa 
1900.” 
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sporadic initiative of some talented scientists, such as Vito Volterra.  27  
On this point, one may be tempted to speculate whether the idealistic 
Italian cultural tradition that took root in this historical period may 
have also played a role in shaping the general cultural outlook of the 
country toward industrial innovation.  28  After World War I, a major 
restructuring of the system of scientiﬁ c research took place, leading 
to the creation in 1923 of Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR). 
This was a major institutional reform adopted by the Fascist regime 
for allegedly boosting the performance of the Italian scientiﬁ c sys-
tem and increasing its connections with industrial ﬁ rms, especially 
in military applications. In fact, most historians agree in considering 
this reorganization as a missed opportunity, because it was carried 
out with a very limited amount of resources and more with a view 
to propagandistic goals than to the real support of promising research 
projects.  29  
 Another missed opportunity is the period 1950 to 1963, when 
the experience of CNR was fraught by an excessive fragmentation of 
resources and by a political inability to focus on the most promising 
projects, as shown by the case of the lukewarm support of research in 
nuclear power systems. After the oil crisis, the Italian system was char-
acterized by a structural lack of resources and by a confusing arrange-
ment of the interaction between the CNR and the university system.  30  
 Innovation Systems and “High-Tech” Entrepreneurship 
 The quantitative picture outlined in the previous section is fully con-
sistent with a stream of research that has pointed to the difﬁ culties faced 
by “Schumpeterian” entrepreneurs in the Italian historical context. 
 27.  Maiocchi, “Il ruolo delle scienze.” According to Maiocchi, during the Liberal 
age, it is very common to ﬁ nd statements like these in the parliamentary discus-
sions: “In Italy we should work more and study less. We should ﬁ rst become a 
wealthy and powerful national and later on we shall become a learned and science-
minded nation” (statement to Parliament of MP Rizzetti in 1894), Ibid., 924. Russo 
and Santoni,  Ingegni minuti . 
 28.  Even Antonio Gramsci realized the negative outlook toward science and 
technology prevailing in the Italian cultural landscape and, in his  Prison Note-
books , wondered, “Why in Italy there is not a popular scientiﬁ c literature like in 
France and in the other countries ?” Cited in Govoni, “Dalla scienza popolare”, 79. 
For an elaboration of this point, see ibid., 79–81. 
 29.  Maiocchi, “Il ruolo delle scienze”; Russo, “Italian Science”; Vasta, “Capitale 
umano.” For a comprehensive study of technological development in military 
applications at the beginning of World War II that shows that, despite some note-
worthy successes, Italy was characterized by a fundamental gap in military equip-
ment, see Zamagni, “Italy.” 
 30.  Vasta, “Capitale umano.” 
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Interestingly, Amatori has recently updated his pioneering contri-
bution, adding to his “classic” entrepreneurial typologies (“Milanese,” 
“supported,” and “public” entrepreneurs), the ﬁ gure of the “real 
Schumpeterian” entrepreneur.  31  However, in his view, this new 
typology is limited to the Golden Age (1950–1970). In this period, the 
“glorious years,” few great ﬁ gures were able to successfully exploit 
the mass production trajectory. According to Amatori, some of these 
entrepreneurs, such as Sinigaglia (Finsider) and Mattei (ENI), perform 
their role as managers of the most important state-owned enterprises 
of the country.  32  Recently, Toninelli and Vasta, by adopting multi-
ple correspondence analysis and cluster analysis, have proposed a 
new taxonomy of Italian entrepreneurship. They show the structural 
absence of Schumpeterian innovative virtues in the Italian context. 
Moreover, their analysis indicates that the few genuine “Schumpet-
erian” entrepreneurs did not operate in high-tech sectors but, on the 
contrary, in traditional industries such as, for example, pasta (Piero 
Barilla) and world-renowned brands in clothing and fashion (Aldo 
Gucci). Thus, the Schumpeterian virtues of this category of entrepre-
neurs consists more of their the ability to ﬁ nd new markets and, more 
generally, their capacity to successfully expand their business abroad 
rather than their genuine innovative capabilities. In other words, we 
can say that the innovative virtues of the Schumpeterian component 
of Italian entrepreneurship are more linked to a consolidated feature 
of the entire history of modern Italy (producing traditional goods of 
superior quality), than to the real capacity to create new products or 
processes close to the technological frontier.  33  
 The link between the marginal role of Schumpeterian entrepre-
neurship and the structural deﬁ ciencies of the Italian innovation 
system may be appreciated by considering two cases of the failure 
of the Italian innovation system to exploit breakthrough inventions 
that were generated in the country. The ﬁ rst case is that of Guglielmo 
Marconi (1874–1937) and the invention of the radio. The invention 
(leading to the ﬁ rst successful experiments on transmission, carried 
out in the spring of 1895) was conceived completely in the Italian 
context. Immediately afterward, Marconi decided to move to England 
to try to exploit his invention there through the family connections 
of his (Irish) mother who was related to the Jameson family of whisky 
 31.  Amatori, “Entrepreneurial Typologies in the History of Industrial Italy 
(1880–1960)” and “Entrepreneurial Typologies in the History of Industrial Italy: 
Reconsiderations.” 
 32.  This tradition of relative success was possibly continued by the state-owned 
Finmeccanica in the more recent period; see Felice, “State-Ownership and Inter-
national Competitiveness.” 
 33.  Toninelli and Vasta, “Opening the Black Box.” 
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producers. As Guagnini has shown, the initial plan was to take a patent 
for the invention in England, sell it, and then return to Italy to fur-
ther develop the innovation. In England, Marconi found access to key 
resources and capabilities that were of crucial importance for moving 
from a prototype invention to a commercial innovation and to the 
creation of a successful “high-tech” company. In particular, Guagnini 
points to two key factors: (1) the contribution offered by the patent 
agents (Carpmael & Co.) in drafting a very sound patent speciﬁ cation 
and in successfully extending this protection in the most important 
international patent ofﬁ ces; and (2) the contribution offered by a 
number of legal advisers in working out the agreements and contracts 
for the startup company. It is difﬁ cult to imagine counterparts of these 
ingredients in the Italian context.  34  
 The second case is the attempt by Olivetti to penetrate the inter-
national computer industry during the 1950s and early 1960s. In 
retrospect, the initial phase of this project was a success. In a short 
period, Olivetti was able to create a very strong research center in 
computer science, directed by Mario Tchou (1924–1961). The com-
pany also established a fruitful partnership with the research labo-
ratory of the University of Pisa. The outcome of this efforts were the 
Elea 9003 (launched in 1959), which was the ﬁ rst fully transistorized 
commercial computer, and the P101, designed by the engineer Pier 
Giorgio Perotto (1930–2002) and launched in 1964, which might be 
regarded as the ﬁ rst personal computer. These were no mean feats 
for a country that, in the early 1950s, was completely lagging behind 
in this technological ﬁ eld. However, the subsequent history of com-
puting technology in Italy clearly shows the exceptional character 
of these achievements that probably owed more to the exceptional 
entrepreneurial abilities of their founders than to the broader context 
in which they were nurtured. Thus, the untimely deaths of Adriano 
Olivetti (1960) and Mario Tchou (1961) represented a major blow 
for the creation of an Italian player in the computer manufacturing 
industry. Following the ﬁ nancial difﬁ culties of the Olivetti company, 
the electronics department was sold to General Electric. Interestingly 
enough, in this decision, neither the private shareholders who were 
in control of the company at the time nor the public actors made any 
assessment of the possible long-term beneﬁ ts of maintaining an Ital-
ian presence in such a strategic high-tech sector.  35  
 34.  Guagnini, “Patent Agents” and “Dall’invenzione all’impresa.” 
 35.  Pivato,  Il miracolo scippato . See also Soria,  Informatica: un’occasione 
perduta and, for an account dealing with the Italian cultural attitude toward 
information and communication technologies, see Pogliano, “Le nuove mac-
chine.” 
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 Contextual Factors: The Dynamics of Real Wages 
 The ﬁ nal element of our quantitative overview of the Italian NIS is 
represented by what we consider an important contextual factor. The 
indicators we have considered so far provide the picture of a country 
characterized by a very limited investment of resources in scientiﬁ c and 
technological activities and by a relatively marginal position in these 
areas when compared with those of other major industrialized countries. 
This conﬁ guration was sustainable because the Italian economy, as illus-
trated by  Figure 4 , could enjoy a relatively sluggish dynamics of real 
wages from the uniﬁ cation until at least the late 1960s.  36   Figure 4 shows 
the ratios between the indices of real wages for some major industri-
alized countries and the Italian level (if the ratio is lower than 100, then 
Italy has a proportionally lower real wage than the other country).  37  
 In our view, it is plausible to assume that low real wages repre-
sented a powerful “compensating factor” for the structural weak-
nesses of the innovation system. In other words, low real wages were 
a safety valve that Italian ﬁ rms and entrepreneurs could activate to 
counterbalance their own ineffective innovation activities. Further-
more, it is also likely that in the long run, this lethargic dynamics of 
real wages might have exerted further negative effects by discouraging 
  
 Figure 4  Comparative real wages, 1870–1988 
 Source: Our own elaborations on Williamson, “The Evolution of Global Labor 
Markets.” 
 36.  The connection between real wages and the lack of investments in scientiﬁ c 
and industrial research by ﬁ rms is also suggested by Maiocchi, particularly in rela-
tion to the Giolittian period and the period 1950–1970; Maiocchi, “Il ruolo delle 
scienze”: 918 and 970. For a comparative analysis of the historical dynamics of 
real wages, see Williamson, “The Evolution of Global Labor Markets” and the more 
recent estimates of de Zwart, van Leeuwen, and van Leeuwen-Li, “Real Wages 
since 1820.” For studies on Italy in the Liberal and Fascist periods, see, Zamagni, 
“La dinamica dei salari” and “The Daily Wages.” 
 37.  Williamson, “The Evolution of Global Labor Markets.” 
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the systematic search for improvements in labor productivity and the 
substitution of capital equipment for labor.  38  
 Conclusions 
 Our reappraisal has conﬁ rmed that the Italian pattern of “modern 
economic growth” is indeed a peculiar one, structurally character-
ized on the one hand by limited investments in R&D activities and in 
education and, on the other hand, by a limited capacity of generating 
innovations and being competitive in high tech industries. Our study 
shows that the origins of this structural weakness have deep historical 
roots. In the Liberal age, there was a substantial lack of appreciation 
of the key role of scientiﬁ c research. During the Fascist period, it is 
possible to see a more determined attempt of constructing a system 
of scientiﬁ c research capable of both generating scientiﬁ c results and 
developing new industrial applications. However, the Fascist contri-
bution to the construction of such a system was more rhetoric than 
real. Overall, this disregard toward science and technology consti-
tuted a very heavy burden that could not easily be overcome, even in 
the post-World War II phase. Although it is surely possible to iden-
tify a number of success stories both in scientiﬁ c research and indus-
trial R&D during the Golden Age (1950–1973), this historical phase 
remained a missed opportunity for an effective consolidation of the 
Italian NIS. One may also be tempted to speculate whether, since the 
1980s, the rhetoric of the industrial districts and the anti-Chandlerian 
“small is beautiful” literature may also account for the complacency 
concerning the failure of the Italian NIS.  39  In this perspective, Italy’s 
position among the richest countries of the world is not to be regarded 
as ﬁ rmly secured. In our view, the evidence discussed in this article 
clearly supports the pessimists’ view. In fact, the Italian model of 
development characterized by a scarce attention to innovative per-
formance and by an inbuilt tendency to rely on a compression of the 
dynamics of real wages appears as an inherent fragile construction. 
 To sum up, our historical appraisal suggests that Italian NIS, from 
the uniﬁ cation until today, was characterized by a peculiar shadowy 
 38.  The possible connection between high wages and innovation has been 
recently also discussed by Allen in the context of the British industrial revolution: 
Allen,  The British Industrial Revolution . 
 39.  A recent example of the “small is beautiful” rhetoric is the novel by E. Nesi, 
 Storia della mia gente (awarded the prestigious Strega literary prize in 2011), 
which is an epic but ultimately not convincing account of the Prato textile district 
from the 1950s to the crisis of the 2000s. For a deeper discussion of the economics 
underlying Nesi’s novel, see Adamo, ‘The Crisis of the Prato’. 
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or “ghostly” nature. In Italian economic history, it has been largely 
invisible, forcing the country to adopt a peculiar road toward “mod-
ern economic growth” based on the combination of low real wages 
and the intensive use of unskilled labor. We should, of course, rec-
ognize that along speciﬁ c dimensions, such as the assimilation and 
adaptation of foreign technologies, the Italian NIS provided a sig-
niﬁ cant contribution and that, in a few historical moments, the Ital-
ian NIS was also, against all odds, capable of generating important 
advances in both scientiﬁ c research and industrial applications. On 
further reﬂ ection, however, these sporadic appearances—which are 
more due to lucky accidents than to planning and design—also ﬁ t the 
analogy of the ghost rather well. In this perspective, one may even be 
tempted to extend the analogy to the frail and ineffectual ghost that, 
according to Oscar Wilde, was living in Canterville Chase. 
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